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PROTECTION AGAINST THE ABUSE OF
ECONOMIC POWER IN BELGIUM:
THE LAW OF MAY 27, 1960
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INTRODUCTION
On May 27, 1960, seventy years after the passage of the Sherman
Act ' in the United States, the Belgian Parliament enacted a compre-
hensive law against the abuse of economic power.' The reasons for
Belgium's prolonged failure to legislate on restrictive practices are
intimately bound up with the structure of the nation's economy.
Factors Impeding Enactment of an Antitrust Law
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Belgium's heavy in-
dustries-steel, coal, nonferrous metals, and glass-were among the
leading ones on the European continent. These industries owed their
power to the financial support of mighty "groups," such as the Soci6t
G~nrale de Belgique, which exerted a dominant influence on the
Belgian economy until 1935. In that year the separation of "deposit
banks" from "business banks," to prevent the investment of bank de-
posits in industry, severely diminished the economic influence of these
holding companies.
In addition to heavy industry, Belgium's economy is character-
ized by a very large number of small enterprises, each inadequately
armed to protect itself against competition, especially from foreign
quarters. Their plight has been made more acute by the lowering of
tariff barriers within the Common Market. The Belgian Parliament
has long tried to foster "rationalization" of the nation's economy by
promoting mergers and concentrations through fiscal and other
t Professeur Extraordinaire a la Facult6 de Droit de Lifge. Docteur en Droit
1932, Universit6 de Liege; Agr~g6 de lenseignement sup1rieur 1936.
T Collaborateur Scientifique du Patrimoine de l'Universit6 de Lifge. Docteur en
Droit 1960, Universit6 de Liege.
126 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
2The law was published in the [1960] MONITEUR BELGE 4674, 5210 (the official
Belgian gazette). For a more detailed commentary see DEL MARmOL, LA PROTEcON
CONTRE LES ABUS DE PUISSANCE tCONOMIQUE EN DROIT BELGE, Collection scientifique
de ]a Facult6 de Droit de Liege, Universit6 de Lifge (Belgium).
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measures. Already, Royal Decree Number 62 of January 13,
1935 '3-the "decree on compulsory cartels"-had enabled the stipula-
tions of agreements between members of trade associations to be made
compulsory in entire sectors of the economy. The decree resulted from
the economic crisis of a time when it was thought that "confident and
efficient cooperation between Belgian producers in the same branch
of industry . . . had become an absolutely unavoidable necessity." 4
Since 1918 Belgiun's free-exchange policy (except in the field of
agricultural products) has permitted foreign competitors to check the
influence of local monopolies and temper the workability of cartels.
This liberal trade policy, by insuring competition in most branches of
the Belgian economy, deferred any felt need for antitrust legislation.
Even before the 1960 law, there were several judicial devices for
controlling abuses of economic power and excessive restrictions on
competition. Articles 6 and 1131 of the Civil Code empower courts to
cancel contracts contrary to public policy (l'ordre public). A decree
of March 17, 1791, proclaims that "any person is free to pursue what-
ever business or to practice whatever job, art, or handicraft he finds
good . . . ." That text, dating from the French Revolution and still
in force in Belgium, embodies the principle of free enterprise. Although
not incorporated into the Belgian Constitution, it is the basis of the
nation's economic organization; and Belgian courts have frequently
resorted to it as a rationale for cancelling certain agreements, especially
boycott cartels, for example, in cases in which a tradesman's economic
existence is threatened by a seller's refusal to deal with him. The
fundamental article on tort liability in Belgium's Civil Code ' has been
applied to restraints of trade to enable victims of unfair competition to
obtain damages. A 1934 decree grants competitors the right to file
suit to end unfair commercial practices.' Penal laws punish those who
fraudulently control prices.7
Postwar Developments Encouraging Antitrust Legislation
Despite this background, three factors induced the Belgian Parlia-
ment to legislate on the abuse of economic power: the influence of the
3 [1935] MoNiTzuR BLGE 229, 2 LEs CODEs LARcraR 401 (1959) (Bel.).
4 Report by M. d'Alcantara in the Belgian House of Representatives, ANNALES
PARLELS-NTAMES, CHASBRE, May 18, 1960, at 3. At about the same time in the
United States, the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), had
authorized "codes" legalizing and even imposing cartels aimed at preventing com-
petition which would lower prices.
5 "Tout fait quelconque de l'hoinine, qui cause a autrui un dommage, oblige cehii
par la faute duquel il est arrivi t le riparer." CODE CwviL art. 1382 (Bel. 1 Larder
1959).
6 Royal Decree No. 55, Dec. 23, 1934, [1934] MoNiTEUR BELGE 6851, 2 LEs CODES
LARcmR 358 (1959) (Bel.).
7 See CODE PNAL art. 311 (Bel. 2 Larder 1959) ; Law of July 18, 1924, 2 LEs
CODES LARCnm 423 (1959) (Bel.).
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United States, European international cooperation, and internal polit-
ical developments.
Influence of the United States
At the end of World War II, the United States urged members
of the United Nations to fight against practices restricting competi-
tion.8 The upshot was the UNESCO-sponsored Conference on Trade
and Employment which promulgated the Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization (1948), chapter five of which was
devoted to restrictive commercial practices.9 In the agreements for
economic cooperation between the United States and countries bene-
fiting from the European Recovery Program, the European govern-
ments promised to take measures to prevent restrictive commercial
practices in international trade.Y
European International Cooperation
The development of supranational institutions in Western Europe
and the awakening spirit of a European community have had a grow-
ing influence upon the Belgian attitude toward antitrust legislation. The
underlying change is embodied in several treaties, such as those creating
the European Coal and Steel Community, the Community for Atomic
Energy (Euratom), and, most important, the European Economic
Community (Common Market) between France, West Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. These treaties, which
opened a market of 160 million people to the enterprises of the six mem-
ber-nations, will undoubtedly cause economic units to adapt to the size
of this market by mergers and industrial agreements." Insofar as this
evolution impairs free competition, it will be subject to articles 65 and
66 of the Coal and Steel Community Treaty and articles 85 and 86 of the
Common Market Treaty, concerning cartels and monopolies." Article
87 of the Common Market Treaty implies that national governments
must make the necessary regulations and appoint authorities to co-
operate in the application of articles 85 and 86. The countries which
8 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2411, COMMER CIAL POLICY SER. No. 79, PRO-
POSALS FOR EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT 4-5, 19 (1945).
9U.N. Doc. No. E/Conf.2/78 at 35-38 (1948). Only that part of the Charter
containing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was ratified by the
number of states required to bring it into force.
'OE.g., Economic Cooperation Agreement With Italy, June 28, 1948, art. II,
para. 3, 62 Stat. 2428, T.I.A.S. No. 1789.
11 See Van Themaat, Rides of Competition and Restrictive Trade Practices, in
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE EUROPEAN
FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION 83-84 (International and Comparative Law Quarterly
Supplementary Publication No. 1, 1961).
12 See also id. at 84.
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had not yet passed national antitrust laws-Belgium, Italy, and Luxem-
bourg-were thus compelled to plan, at a minimum, their participation
in antitrust action under the treaty.13 It was difficult for them not to
consider passing national laws on internal restrictions of competition
at the same time.
Internal Political Developments
Finally, an internal pressure toward the adoption of an antitrust
law had been developing in Belgium. Once the decree of 1935 on
compulsory cartels came into force, the need for a counterweight was
felt. It was on the basis of the public interest (l'intiret gingral) that
the requests of the trade associations were to be considered: the same
public interest could justify the prohibition of abusive restrictions on
competition. Preliminary drafts of an antitrust law were prepared as
early as 1936, but the outbreak of the war did not allow them to reach
the stage of parliamentary debate.
The situation of the country after the war stimulated a fever of
government control of the economy by various regulations. A bill "on
the control of financial enterprises" was introduced in the Senate on
November 13, 1945, by Social-Christian Senator Ronse.'4 It pro-
posed to empower the Commission Bancaire 5 to exert a "watchful con-
trol on financial groups," and "to take any decision required by the
public interest (l'intiret giniral)," since "the influence of these finan-
cial groups on the economy of the country can . . . cause abuse." The
Ronse bill was not even discussed in Parliament. In 1947, Repre-
sentative Jean Duvieusart introduced another bill dealing with protec-
tion against abuses of economic power, 6 but the inertia of parlia-
mentary procedure and various events in Belgian politics delayed the
enactment of an antitrust law for thirteen years.
Arguments during these years of maturation concerned chiefly
the administration and scope of the proposed law. No serious dis-
agreement as to its necessity developed. All three major political
parties agreed on the proposal, but for different reasons. The Socialist
party (PSB), the second largest political party, and the socialist labor
union (Fidration Gingral du Travail de Belgique) supported an anti-
trust law as a first, albeit insufficient, step toward complete govern-
3 Id. at 85.
14 [1945-46] DOCUMENTS PARLEMENTAIRES, S NAT, No. 6. Financial enterprises
are known in Belgium by the word "holding."
15 This commission performs a similar function, with regard to the issuance of
securities, as the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
16 [1946-47] DOCUMENTS PARLEMENTARES, CHAmBRE, No. 123.
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ment control of the economy.17  The large Social-Christian party
(PSC) and the smaller Liberal party (PL) accepted the contributions
of big capitalistic enterprises to a healthy economy, but espoused public
control of abusive practices to protect smaller businessmen and con-
sumers. 8 The basic choice to prohibit only the abuses of economic
power, and not to forbid restrictions of competition per se, was made
at the very beginning and was never questioned in the later stages. 9
On December 15, 1959, the Belgian Senate passed the present
antitrust law by a vote of 131-1 with seven abstentions. On May 19,
1960, the House approved, 177-3 with three abstentions.
Tentative Character of the New Act
It is important to point out the part played by the Conseil Central
de l'Economie in the formulation of the statute. This Council, an
advisory institution composed of an equal number of representatives
of employers and labor associations, was consulted twice, in 1952 and
1958. In the course of its 1958 proceedings, business and labor repre-
17 In a report prepared for its 1956 convention, the FGTB described the grip of
financial groups on the Belgian economy and expressed its claims as follows: "The
problem is no longer to choose between a planned economy and a competitive economy.
It is only to know who will assume leadership of the economy. Should it be left
to the capitalists from whom one cannot demand or expect that the economy be
led in a direction other than that of their personal interests, or should it return to
the State, which represents l'intjr~t gingral? Our answer is that private feudalities
must return to the democratic order. Leadership in the economy must be exercised by
the government, in the interest of the community and under its control." FPDkRATION
GL-NIRALE Du TRAvAIL DE BELGIQUE, HOLDINGS ET D-MoCRATIE ECONOMIQUE 216
(1956). During the House debates, a Socialist representative threw his group's
support behind the bill, but underlined its weaknesses, foreseeing possible amendments
in the future. ANNALES PARLEMENTAIRES, CHAMBRE, May 18, 1960, at 6.
18 A Liberal representative declared: "We Liberals believe one of the most im-
portant duties of any government is to secure the defense of freedom, social and
economic. The return to a perfect intercourse of free competition is an essential
item in our economic program. We approve of any measures which favor true com-
petition in the future. Everyone, including the most prominent legal minds, is ready
to acknowledge that economic power and property rights must be limited. It can be
stated that this bill is of liberal inspiration, which will soothe all the supporters of
a free economy and personal initiative." ANNALES PARLEMENTAIRES, CHAM RE,
May 18, 1960, at 8. The Social-Christian view was similar: "It is not necessary
to be a great economist to know that competition does not always produce the best
results." Big business is necessary in some parts of the economy and its dynamic
behavior is the basis of real economic progress. Nevertheless, free competition is
"the most effective means of promoting the general welfare." But since producers
do not always obey the rules of the game, "legislation on restrictive agreements and
abuses of economic power is . . . absolutely necessary." [1958] LA REvUE POLITIQuE
428-30.
19 The polar theories of antitrust legislation are the "interdiction" system, which
holds that all cartels should be prohibited, the philosophy prevailing in the United
States, and the "abuse" system, which condemns only the harmful effects of cartels,
the approach of most European anti-restrictive legislation. The debates which took
place at the Havana Conference on Trade and Employment, see text accompanying
notes 8-9 supra, emphasized the differences between these theories. The conflict
cropped up again in 1951 in discussions before UNESCO in which the United States
asked that the legal treatment of restrictive practices in international trade be re-
examined. Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. EcoSoc COUNCIL OFF. REc. 13th
Sess., at 609-46 (E/SR.546-49) (1951).
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sentatives agreed on the fundamental items of an antitrust statute and
thus contributed greatly to the almost unanimous vote for the law in
both houses of Parliament. The Council stressed the fact that this
law should be considered experimental, arguing that the structural
changes which would take place within Belgian industry during the first
years of the Common Market must not be hindered. Thus it should
be possible to change the statute in later years to accord with the laws
applicable in other common market nations and to respond to the
evolution of economic conditions wrought by the Common Market.
The experimental nature of the law was again pointed out during the
parliamentary debates, a fact which indicates that even the legislature
does not consider the law of May 27, 1960, as final.
SCOPE OF THE NEW ACT
Articles 1 and 2 of the law of May 27, 1960, define its scope:
Article 1. Economic power, for purposes of this act, is the
power by which a natural or legal person acting alone, or a group
of these persons acting in concert, can exert within the boundaries
of the Kingdom, through industrial, commercial, agricultural, or
financial activities, a preponderant influence on supplying the
market for commodities or capital, or on the price or quality of
a given commodity or service.
Article 2. There is abuse, according to this law, when one
or more persons, having economic power, harm the public interest
through practices which distort or restrict the normal course of
competition or which hinder either the economic liberty of pro-
ducers, distributors, or consumers, or the development of pro-
duction or exchanges.
Preponderant Economic Power
Concept
There is economic power when a natural or legal person, or group
of such persons, exerts a preponderant influence on a given market.
Economic power as such remains free to act, but if its influence becomes
preponderant and is misused, it may be subject to the procedures pro-
vided by the law. An economic power must be considered preponderant
when it is strong enough to determine by itself industrial or commercial
policy and prices in a given market. "It is necessary . . . that the
person in question . . . dominate the market to such a degree that
by his own decisions he can guide, balance, or unbalance this
market .... , 20
20 [1958-59] DOCUMENTS PARLEMENTAIRES, SNAT, No. 216, at 10-12.
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It will be more difficult to isolate specific enterprises whose
economic power is preponderant than it is to define this concept in the
abstract. Only economic market research in every case will suffice.
2
But meaningful research of this sort is difficult to perform. Within
the framework of the Belgian antitrust law, it would be inadequate to
rate the influence of an economic unit in terms of production, since
much of its output may be for export and hence not covered by the
law. Consequently, influence on the market will generally have to be
analyzed at the consumer level.
Economic power may be defined either according to the form it
takes-monopoly, trust, cartel, pool, konzern, holding-or, rejecting
formal criteria, according to its effects. The new Belgian law, unlike
most of its foreign counterparts, uses the latter method. Once the
decision was made to direct the statute toward the repression of abuses
and not toward a system of interdiction, this choice was quite logical:
abuses occur in the manifestations of economic power on the market,
not a priori in its form. Consequently economic power, as defined in
article one, may be a monopoly or any kind of economic integration
or cooperation-vertical or horizontal integrations, technical accords,
commercial alliances, gentlemen's agreements, or holding companies.
This enumeration is not exhaustive and does not itself appear on the
face of the section defining economic power for the statute: Parliament
was apprehensive that an enumeration of forms would permit certain
persons and groups which it intended to reach to slip through the
interstices. Consequently any form of economic organization comes
within the purview of the law when its influence becomes abusive.
The failure of the Belgian law to distinguish between monopolies
and cartels deserves special attention, since foreign laws generally make
this distinction. For example, the first section of the Sherman Act '
is devoted to cartels and the second to monopolies; 23 the latter section
was written and long interpreted by American courts to treat monop-
olies less severely than cartels. Stress was laid upon the intention to
monopolize a market, while a monopoly created by outside circum-
stances was not per se illegal.24 Recently, however, the courts seem to
be scrutinizing more carefully the behavior of enterprises whose size
alone implies monopoly power.2" The European Coal and Steel Com-
21 Ibid.
2226 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
2326 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
24 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 449-52 (1920);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945)
(L. Hand, J.) (dictum).
25 Schwartz, New Approaches to the Control of Oligopoly, 109 U. PA. L. REv.
31, 36-39 (1960).
BELGIAN ANTITRUST LAW
munity and the Common Market Treaties also distinguish monopolies
from cartels, and strike at monopolies less harshly than at cartels.
26
Perhaps this is so because it is usually considered that cartels impede
progress whereas concentration favors economic development. Once
Parliament had chosen to condemn only abuses, there was no need to
make this distinction, for it does not matter whether an abuse comes
from a monopoly or a cartel. It is possible, of course, that monopolies
will call for less frequent applications of the statute than will cartels.
Time will tell.
It must be remembered that the new Belgian law originated to
counterpoise the royal decree of 1935 on compulsory cartels. Cartels
are not made illegal per se, and some are even compulsory in whole
branches of the economy by virtue of royal decrees.17  But there
is no contradiction between the new law and the existence of govern-
ment-sanctioned cartels: the only groups which may take advantage of
the decree are those consistent with the public interest, and the sanc-
tions of the 1960 law apply only to cartels whose activities are in-
consistent with that interest. The same criterion, the public interest,
approves the former and condemns the latter.
Persons Encompassed by the Law
Article one is aimed expressly and indiscriminately at natural and
legal persons. Any individual or corporate body entitled to legal rights
may come within its purview. Associations with no legal existence,
such as cartels, are subject to the law as "group[s] of . . . persons
acting in concert"; and their officers are responsible for the actions of
the groups they direct. This raises a question as to the law's applica-
tion to commercial groups acting without previous agreement. In
American Tobacco Co.. v. United States,' the United States Supreme
Court held that the existence of collusion could be inferred from the
price-parallelism of the big three cigarette manufacturers, without the
necessity of establishing an express accord among the "conspirators."
The Belgian law gives no precise solution to this question, but it seems
unlikely that it will be read to permit the inference of a concerted com-
mon purpose from the mere existence of identical behavior by several
enterprises.
An important, but temporary exception to the law's application
concerns government-controlled institutions, including provincial and
26 Compare Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April
18, 1951, art. 65, with id., art. 66. Compare Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, March 25, 1957, art. 85, with id., art 86.27 There are now compulsory cartels in only three sectors of the economy-
window panes, glazier's putty, and floor coverings.
28328 U.S. 781 (1946).
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local authorities.29 The theory of this exemption was that these insti-
tutions are already subject to the public interest. Nevertheless, the
exception is regrettable. The public sector of the Belgian economy is
highly developed. The government is an entrepreneur in entertain-
ment, controlling the radio and television networks, in transportation,
with the railroad monopoly and airlines control, in banking, through
various credit institutions, and in insurance, by securing export risks.
The government also monopolizes the telephone and telegraph in-
dustries. The economic power of the state as a buyer comes close to
monopsony in the market for goods used only by state-controlled
enterprises. Within the range of these industrial, commercial, and
financial activities the state may represent a preponderant economic
power in several markets, and could abuse this power by restrictive or
discriminatory practices. Frequently, public service industries indulge
in price discrimination, grant rebates, impose tariffs, or exact fidelity
or exclusivity contracts. It would be normal for the law to reach these
state activities, as do the provisions on competition in the Common
Market and the Coal and Steel Community Treaties. 0 Moreover,
while it is proper in considering the so-called traditional functions of
the state to ask whether the state, which defines the public interest, can
hurt it, the question raises no paradox when applied to the activities
just mentioned. These public services enjoy a large managerial
autonomy; their conduct takes its example from the practices of private
enterprise. It follows that they should be submitted to the same
limitations in the exercise of their economic power.
However, the exemption of government enterprises is only tem-
porary. Article 27 of the law provides that within five years-before
June 1965-the law will be applied to these activities by royal decree.
The decree will be permitted to apply different procedural provisions
to government enterprises from those pertaining to the private sector,
but the definitions of preponderant economic power and abuse may not
be altered.
Enterprises Covered by the Act
The enumerated activities liable to give rise to abuses cognizable
under the new law are industrial and agricultural production, dis-
tribution, and finance. The last term is aimed at holding companies
able to exert a preponderant influence on a given market through sub-
sidiaries. The liberal professions and athletic, philanthropic, religious,
political, and social groups are not subject to the act, even though any
29 The exception was conceded by the Government to disarm the Socialist opposi-
tion, and win its support for the legislation30 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
art. 90; Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, art. 66.
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of these may have a considerable influence on the nation's economy.
One consequence is that labor unions are not covered, for their activities
are thought to be of a social nature and not to belong to the categories
listed in article one. The wisdom of this exception is doubtful. The
ability of labor unions to order strikes is an unquestioned economic
power which can be subject to abuse. However, the parliamentary
debates make it clear that the statute was not intended to be applicable
to labor unions.
Within the framework of the enumerated activities, economic
power must exert its preponderant influence on supplying the market
for commodities or capital or on the price or quality of a given com-
modity or service."1 The law aims at the supply of goods to the market
as well as the price and quality of goods supplied. A difficulty familiar
to economists arises in trying to delimit a relevant market. A market
may be defined with reference to a broad category of products or
limited to a specific product. According to the choice made, the im-
portance of the leading enterprise in the market will appear very
different.3 2
Geographic Scope
The nationality of the person who wields economic power is
unimportant. His activities violate the law as soon as they exert a
preponderant influence in Belgium. The classical rules of conflicts of
law as to legislative jurisdiction are pushed aside by this act pertaining
to Belgian "public policy." It applies to any abusive manifestation
of economic power within the kingdom. However, this statement is
merely academic if the headquarters of an economic power and all of
its property are situated in another country. Enforcement action
based exclusively upon Belgian law would be completely ineffectual in
such a case.
Export cartels may come within the scope of the 1960 law if they
have a preponderant influence in Belgium, for instance, by undermin-
ing the supply of goods in national markets.
The Abuse of Preponderant Economic Power
Article two of the law defines the abuse of economic power as
harming the public interest through restrictive practices. No enumera-
tion of specifically outlawed practices is included in this section.3 3  As
31 The language of article one indicates that dealings with real property are not
subject to the act.
3 For an American example, see United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394-404 (1956).
33 proposal to enumerate in article one certain practices apt to harm the public
interest by distorting the normal course of competition was rejected in order to avoid
any presumption that these practices are necessarily abusive. Nevertheless, a list
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the normal corollary of such a broad definition, each situation must
be separately and profoundly studied, both to determine the existence
of a preponderant economic power and to detect abuses.3 Unquestion-
ably, the new law will be administered on a case-by-case basis. The
statute, like the Sherman Act, was written in general terms in order
to create a wide field of application and to give the competent authori-
ties a chance to appraise a large number of cases. Experience may
show the need for further legislation which, like the Clayton Act, will
be more specific.
Injury to the Public Interest
A preponderant economic power is abused only insofar as it
harms the public interest. A political concept, the public interest
changes according to the orientation of economic policy at the moment,
the structure of the economy, and the ends which the nation wants to
attain. As a consequence, it is difficult, if not impossible, to define
or even describe it adequately. The Minister of Economic Affairs
confessed this difficulty to the Senate, but added, "I think I may say,
in a rather elementary way, that the public interest is the defense of the
collective interest, in opposition to the defense of individual interests
which could sometimes be in contradiction to the interest of the whole
of the collectivity . . . . " 5 As the public interest follows the funda-
mental necessities of the national economy over the years, it may dis-
accord with individual interests, even of important groups or broad
segments of the population. The public interest is not necessarily the
interest of consumers, although a certain tendency appeared during the
drafting of the law to consider its principal aim as protecting con-
sumers against the price manifestations of monopoly. But the legis-
lative dictate is to examine each case with due consideration to all
affected interests. No group, such as producers or distributors, may
be systematically neglected. It is necessary to consider the rights of
the various professions, to weigh the conflicts of interests between dif-
ferent industrial sectors, and, on a broader level, between the different
branches of the economy. Each class of society may feel the effects
of a given situation or practice in a different way.
was contained in the "statement of grounds," a document customarily given to members
of the Belgian Parliament together with a bill to explain the proposed legislation.
Statements of grounds have no legal effect, but they are frequently relied upon to
clarify ambiguous statutory language.
34 Several members of Parliament asked the Minister of Economic Affairs to
decide whether there were abuses in various hypothetical cases. The Minister de-
clined to answer, saying, "the investigation [in each case] will reveal whether or
not specific practices are opposed to the public interest." [1959-60] DocuMENTS
PARLEMENTAIRES, SPNAT, No. 36, at 5.
35 ANNALES PAILEMENTAnRES, SANAT, Dec. 18, 1959, at 143.
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It should be noted that commercial restrictions can favor the
stability of employment whereas free competition may multiply busi-
ness failures. Finally, an expanding volume of international trade may
justify some practices which would seem undesirable in a strictly
national context.
Restrictions on the Normal Course of Competition
As part of its definition of abuse of preponderant economic power,
article two mentions "practices which distort the normal course of
competition." That phrase, borrowed from article 65 of the treaty
creating the European Coal and Steel Community,86 raises many ques-
tions relating to economic theory.
The competitive structures of markets have been the subject of an
abundant economic literature, especially since two works by Professor
Chamberlin s and Mrs. Robinson3 8 dealt a decisive blow to the
classical theory built on the hypothesis of perfect competition. Perfect
competition does not exist. It is a useful but oversimplified model for
commencing the study of market functioning but which must be passed
in order to reach economic reality. Almost the same objection can be
made to the hypothesis of monopoly, which is found in its pure state
only under exceptional circumstances. Actual market structures are
either imperfect states of competition, lacking some of the classical
conditions of perfect competition, or monopolistic competition, which,
according to Professor Chamberlin, has features of both monopoly and
competition, each seller holding a kind of monopoly because of product
differentiation, but each aware of potential competition from other
products which could be substituted for his own should his prices climb
too high. Further economic reseach has defined a large number of
other market structures according to many criteria.
It would be fatuous to try to legislate "perfect competition" into
existence. The Belgian Parliament certainly did not try to do this, as is
shown by its continued approval of certain "imperfect" elements in the
nation's competitive structure, such as the decree on compulsory cartels.
Some deviations from unlimited competition are desirable for Belgium's
economic health. For example, it would be nonsense to insist that elec-
tric power companies compete for customers, and to forbid liaison and
cooperation between them. 9 Similarly, unbounded competition would
36 April 18, 1951. It is interesting to note that this article was drafted by a
group of American lawyers. Compare similar language in the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, art. 85.
3 7 
CHAMBERL N, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTic COMPETITION (1933).
3 8 ROBINSON, THE EcONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933).
39 Reuter, A Propos des Ententes Ind strielles et Commerciales, [1952] DRoIT
SocrAL 442-47.
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be harmful in the coal industry, where constant supply confronts a
variable demand. Moreover, the structure of the Belgian economy
in the face of foreign competition requires some forms of cooperation
between economic units, in spite of the restrictions on competition
which may result. Yet another justification of commercial restrictions
is pointed out in a recent decision of the Cour de Cassation " refusing
to condemn a boycott of a druggist who sold pharmaceutical products
at prices lower than those fixed by a price cartel of pharmaceutical
specialties. The court held that "free competition is not an absolute
right, but is limited by the existence of equal rights for other people.
The exercise of these rights by a group cannot constitute a fault once
it has been established . . . that this cartel defends the legitimate in-
terests of the group by protecting itself against falling prices in order
to maintain both the quality of the product and the proper remuneration
of the profession." Finally, and more generally, it would be para-
doxical to impose the model of perfect competition on the nation's
economy by means of a law whose proclaimed purpose is to strengthen
economic freedom.
What meaning, then, is to be ascribed to the phrase "normal
course of competition"? It is not borrowed from economic theory, the
function of which is to describe and explain. For, we have seen that
economic theory has isolated a number of competitive structures none
of which is a priori more "normal" than others. Normality imports
a value judgment on existing economic facts. In the context of an
antitrust law, it also imports an economic policy-an attempt to in-
fluence economic conditions by perpetuating them in the face of chang-
ing circumstances or altering them according to some preconceived
plan. An antitrust law is an instrument of economic policy designed
to protect a competitive order which the state considers necessary for
the welfare of the national economy. Certainly the Belgian law comes
within this description by defining "abuse" as a harm done to the
public interest. Such harm must manifest itself by interfering with
the normal course of competition. The term "normal" is pregnant with
economic policy. The normal course of competition is not a fact; it is
nothing more than the degree of competition considered desirable. The
problem of economic policy, and the key to understanding the term
"normal," lies in describing the characteristics of the type of com-
petition which is desired rather than those created by the spontaneous
intercourse of ideal economic mechanisms. Competition is not a self-
sufficient end, but a means toward a desired result which must be
40 Judgment of June 2, 1960, [1960] 1 Pasicrisie, 1133 (Bel.). Roughly, the Cour
de Cassation is Belgium's supreme court.
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articulated by fundamentally political institutions. Their choice, ex-
pressed in terms of their conception of the best working of the economy
and the growth of the national welfare, will determine the "normal
course of competition."
PROCEDURE
Whereas the first two articles of the new Belgian antitrust law
purposely define its scope very broadly, the fifteen articles which follow
set forth detailed procedures for its enforcement. There are three
main stages involving three competent authorities. Preliminary in-
vestigations and hearings to discover abuses of economic power are
conducted by the commissaire-rapporteur, a magistrate appointed by
the King from among the public prosecutors who have been in office
at least five years. The commissaire's affirmative findings of abuse are
reviewed by the Conseil du Contentieux Economique, an institution
created in 1935 to hear requests for the establishment of compulsory
cartels in various branches of the economy. Since the 1960 law is
considered a counterpart of the 1935 decree and the criterion to be
applied-the public interest-is the same, it was thought logical to
give the Conseil jurisdiction over cases concerning the abuse of eco-
nomic power. The Conseil is composed of a president, a vice-president,
and six members, all appointed by the King from the judiciary. Like
the commissaire they are magistrates and remain subject to judicial
discipline. Cases in which the Conseil affirms the commissaire's find-
ings of abuse are referred with the Conseil's recommendations to the
Minister of Economic Affairs, who may negotiate, conciliate, and,
finally, coerce the implicated parties to end their abusive practices.
Proceedings Before the Commissaire-Rapporteur
The commissaire-rapporteur is in charge of turning up abuses of
economic power. In any case he may use either of two procedures,
a hearing (information) or an investigation (instruction). He starts
the hearing procedure sua sponte or at the request of the Minister when
there are serious indications of an abuse of economic power in a given
market. In the course of the hearing the commissaire-rapporteur may
call for "any information fit to enlighten him" and hear "all persons
likely to provide him with useful information," but he has no power
to compel testimony or the production of documents. He reports the
results of a hearing to the Minister.
The investigation is a more elaborate procedure undertaken at the
suggestion of the Minister of Economic Affairs or on the complaint
of "any natural or legal persons or of organizations representing com-
mon interests, harmed by practices falling under article two." The
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commissaire-rapporteur may decline to investigate any complaint which
is groundless on its face if he informs the Minister and the complain-
ants of the reasons for his decision. Parliament granted this prelim-
inary sifting power in order to compensate for its liberality in permit-
ting private individuals and groups such as trade associations, labor
unions, and consumers' organizations to lodge complaints. If he ac-
cepts a complaint, the commissaire-rapporteur proceeds with the in-
vestigation itself, for which he is armed with important powers to
facilitate collecting all the information and documents he considers
useful. He may gather evidence, resort to experts, and, within limits,
conduct searches. The commissaire's deputies and other government
agents assist in conducting an investigation. At the end of this pro-
cedure the commissaire-rapporteur formally decides either to drop the
case or to forward it to the Conseil du Contentieux Economique. If
he drops the case, he must inform the Minister, who may, within thirty
days, overrule the commissaire's decision and continue the proceedings
by referring the case to the Conseil. If the Minister accepts the com-
missaire's decision, the complainant and the implicated parties are
notified. Any case undertaken at the Minister's behest may be dis-
continued by the commissaire-rapporteur after investigation. If the
commissaire considers the case proper to forward to the Conseil du
Contentieux Economique, the case enters the second procedural phase.
Proceedings Before the Conseil du Contentieux Economique
The Conseil de Contentieux Economique takes jurisdiction when
the commissaire-rapporteur files the dossier at the Conseil's secretariat,
or when the Minister reports a case in which he has rejected the com-
missaire's negative decision. The parties are informed that their case
has been forwarded to the Conseil and of the date on which a hearing
is scheduled. In the meantime they may consult the dossier and file
briefs supporting their arguments.
The procedure before the Conseil is mainly written, although there
is a hearing at which the Conseil listens to the parties or their repre-
sentatives, to the commissaire-rapporteur, who may have been asked
to make further inquiries, and to the complainants, if the Conseil finds
it expedient to invite them. In addition, the Conseil is assisted by four
experts in the field of economics who give their written opinions and
take part in the debates, but do not vote. For each case, the experts
are chosen by the Conseil from lists prepared by the Conseil Central
de l'Economie and the Minister of Economic Affairs. The proceed-
ings are closed to the public since "there are trade secrets, commercial
devices, and sometimes even information of a diplomatic or political
[Vo1.109:922
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nature whose utility could be injured by publicity." 4' The opinion
of the Conseil is published only if conciliation by the Minister fails and
it is necessary to issue a royal decree in order to end the abuse.
The expenses of the proceedings are normally borne by the state:
even though an abuse is established it is not a criminal offense. Be-
sides, it makes sense that the state should undertake the cost of main-
taining the competitive order which it has adopted to further its
economic policy. Nevertheless, the law provides that the King may
"recover the expenses."
The Conseil finishes its task by preparing a formal opinion. In
it the Conseil analyzes the "economic balance sheet" by weighing all
the factual elements in the case to determine whether the implicated
persons or group represents a preponderant economic power in a rele-
vant market, and whether the practice restricting the normal course
of competition with which they are charged harms the public interest.
The opinion is handed to the Minister of Economic Affairs, the impli-
cated parties, and whoever filed the complaint. If it states that there
is no abuse, the case is closed and the Conseil's decision binds the
Minister. If, on the other hand, the opinion affirms that there is an
abuse of economic power, it is accompanied by recommendations to
end the abuse, and the third stage of the proceedings begins.
Proceedings Before the Minister of Economic Affairs
Although the Minister is bound by a decision of the Conseil du
Contentieu% Economique that there is no abuse, if the Conseil's opinion
is affirmative, the Minister is free to reject its conclusions. However,
this alternative seems rather academic; in the large majority of cases
the Minister will probably accept the findings of the Conseil without
necessarily adopting all of its remedial proposals.
The proceedings before the Minister start with conciliation. It is
hoped that all cases will be solved at that stage, making it unnecessary
to resort to coercion. The Minister or his deputy summons the per-
sons involved, listens to their observations, and suggests ways to end
the abuse. If his recommendations are accepted, the agreement is re-
corded and the Moniteur belge publishes a notice that the case is
closed, without revealing the contents of the agreement4 The parties
are pledged to fulfill the agreement reached with the Minister. If they
4lVerhaegen, [1947] JoUkNAL DES TRI uNAUX 534.
42 The conciliation practice has some resemblance to consent decrees which con-
dude many antitrust actions in the United States. However, the bargaining power
of companies under investigation is not as strong in Belgium as in America, since
negotiations take place before the Minister, who personally holds coercive power
should efforts at conciliation fail. In the United States most compromises are sought
before the Federal Trade Commission, but it is the judiciary which decides upon
compulsory measures if no compromise is reached.
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do not, the Minister directly submits a decree to the King, bypassing
the second stage of the proceedings, that of mandatory recommenda-
tions. Indeed, that phase of proceedings before the Minister takes
place only when conciliation has failed. In such a case the Minister
orders the parties to effect his recommendations within a specified time,
giving them a final chance to end the abuse voluntarily.
If the persons whose activities were investigated do not respect
the conciliation agreement or do not obey a ministerial order after
conciliation has failed, the Minister asks the King to issue a decree
stating the existence of the abuse and ordering measures necessary to
end it within a given time. The parties are notified of the royal decree
which is published in the Moniteur belge along with the original opinion
written by the Conseil du Contentieux Economique.
There has been some dispute over the measures which a royal
decree may order in these cases. The "statement of grounds"43
simply mentions "adequate" measures and explains its laconism as
necessary "to enable the executive to evaluate the sanctions in the best
way for all concerned, having regard to the seriousness of the various
offenses." " Yet some contend that a royal decree may only inter-
diet-that it may not order the performance of affirmative acts.45
However, the principles of an abuse system do not compel this con-
clusion; although no specific practices are made a priori illegal, once
it is established that a business has been guilty of abusive behavior in
the whole course of its conduct, the executive may well point to specific
acts whose omission stands in the way of ending the abuse. It follows
that the decree should be able to order all that is necessary to put an
end to the abuse, no matter whether these injunctions are negative or
positive.
The law does provide for severe measures against corporations
guilty of further abuses after having been the object of a royal decree
or a ministerial order. These sanctions are intended to go beyond
eliminating abuses and attack the maleficent economic power itself.
The King may prohibit mergers and interlocking directorates, forbid
one company from acquiring shares in another, and even order the
sale of certain holdings.4"
43 See note 33 mspra.
44 [1958-59] DOCUMENTS PARLEMENTAIRES, SANAT, No. 216, at 22.
4 5 
ANNALES PARLEMENTAIRES, CHAMBRE, May 18, 1960, at 4.
46 The last sanction is inspired by United States practice. See United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 150-53 (1948); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 77-79 (1911); cf. United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 177 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1959), prob. juris. noted, 362 U.S. 986 (1960) (No.
781, 1959 Term; renumbered No. 55, 1960 Term).
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At the end of three years a person who has been subjected to
ministerial compulsion or a royal decree is entitled to an official an-
nouncement that the abuse has ceased.
The fact that enforcement of the Belgian antitrust law is placed in
the hands of the executive, in contrast to the situation in the United
States where only the courts are empowered to order coercive measures
against restrictive practices, bears comment. The Belgian solution is
based on the understanding that "abuse" is defined as doing harm to
the public interest-a concept filled with the basic aims of the nation's
economic policy. It was logical for Parliament to vest coercive power
in the executive branch since it is the one to define and realize this
policy as part of its program of overall economic planning. Neverthe-
less, this choice elicited much controversy during the drafting of the
statute. One suggestion was to empower the Cours d'Appel, judicial
bodies, to determine abuses of economic power; but the Conseil d'Etat 47
opposed this plan as contrary to the principle of separation of powers,
since the criterion of abuse is the public interest. Other opponents of
the suggestion pointed to the danger of contradictory court decisions,
the incompetence of judges on economic matters, and the need to make
Belgian law consistent with that of other Common Market nations.
In reality the final solution does not leave much room for arbitrary
executive enforcement. The commissaire-rapporteur, appointed by
the King from among the public prosecutors, is really not a representa-
tive of the executive and is largely independent of the Minister of
Economic Affairs.. The commissaire's only obligations to the executive
are to commence proceedings at the Minister's request and to notify
him if the hearing procedure is to be initiated or a case is to be dropped
after an investigation. Moreover, only judges may vote in the Conseil
du Contentieux Economique, and their negative opinion terminates any
proceedings under the act, while their affirmative conclusions are merely
the basis for further proceedings. The phase of negotiation and con-
ciliation before the Minister should solve most cases by consent, leav-
ing only a persistent few to the compulsory orders provided by law.
Finally, ordinary courts still have their full prior competence despite
the law of May 27, 1960.
Penal Sanctions
Neither economic power nor its abuse is criminal; however, viola-
tion of a decree ordering the end of an abuse is a crime which may be
47 The Conseil d'Etat is a dual institution: an administrative section hears ap-
peals from administrative decisions; a legislative section given advisory opinions on
proposed legislation.
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punished by eight days' to one year's imprisonment and a fine of from
10,000 to 1,000,000 francs.48 Penalties are higher for violating a royal
decree directed toward a subsequent abuse and for committing an
abuse within five years after having failed to end a prior abuse during
the required period. It is also a crime to interfere with the conduct
of investigations by the commissaire-rapporteur or to give false state-
ments to him. Organizations with legal personality are liable for fines
incurred by the misdemeanors of their agents, whereas unincorporated
associations will probably be punished through their officers.
Judicial Competence Under Prior Laws
Even before the adoption of the 1960 law on the abuse of eco-
nomic power there were some legal devices for controlling restrictive
practices in Belgium.4' The 1960 act fills significant gaps in the old
laws which permitted many grave abuses to go untouched. But it does
not repeal the former laws nor the competence of the ordinary courts.
The cases selected by the commissaire-rapporteur for submission to
the Conseil du Contentieux Economique are only those which raise
questions of the public interest. The judiciary retains exclusive juris-
diction to protect private rights and may even adjudicate the private
aspects of disputes which might fall under the new law. However,
it is likely that where a choice is available, aggrieved parties will prefer
the procedure afforded by the new act for its expedition and economy.
On the other hand, where pecuniary damages are sought, it will be
necessary to resort to ordinary litigation.
Appeals
As a rule, only final decisions may be appealed. The Minister
may thus appeal from a negative opinion by the Conseil du Contentieux
Economique to the administrative section of the Conseil d'Etat.
Likewise a royal decree ordering the termination of an abuse may be
appealed to the same judicial body. Royal decrees which go beyond the
authority conferred on the executive are subject to collateral attack
under article 107 of the Constitution, which directs courts to refuse
enforcement to royal decrees they consider illegal.
CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE EUROPEAN TREATIES
As the importance of European national borders recedes and
economic units distend among the nations, it is reasonable to suppose
48 Roughly, $200 to $20,000.
49 See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
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that the principal antitrust problems of the next few years will concern
international law rather than the Belgian law of May 27, 1960. It is
nevertheless important to solve the problems of construction and
reconciliation between the national and international laws.
The Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, signed by six countries, adopts an interdiction system as to
cartels 50 (with certain exceptions) and an abuse system combined
with a requirement of prior authorization as to concentrations. 51 In
case of an inconsistency between Belgian law and the treaty, with refer-
ence to any enterprise which is subject to both, 2 the treaty undoubtedly
must control. Indeed, the statement of grounds appended to the new
Belgian act confirms that "the present bill does not limit [Belgium's
approval of] . . . the Treaty Establishing the Coal and Steel Com-
munity." "
Reconciling the antitrust law contained in the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community (Common Market) is more deli.
cate. Articles 85 and 86 forbid cartels, with certain exceptions, and
repress abuses of concentration insofar as they affect trade between
member-nations. Article 87 provides that the EEC Council will
promulgate "all useful regulations or recommendations for the ap-
plication of the principles expressed by articles 85 and 86." From this
language it has been argued that the preceding two articles are not
self-executing, but are merely to guide the drafting of national statutes.
The adoption of regulations under article 87 should render this contro-
versy moot; but early in 1961 they were still being prepared. Mean-
while, Belgium has followed the requirements of article 88 of the
treaty, which directs that until article 87 regulations come into force,
the individual member nations are to decide on the admission of
cartels and the misuse of economic hegemony in the Common Market.
The new Belgian act applies its own procedure to cases arising under
the Common Market, but the substantive law of the treaty, which
forbids cartels and condemns abuses of concentration.
CONCLUSION
The Belgian law of May 27, 1960, must be considered in light of
the circumstances which necessitated it and the framework in which
50 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951,
art. 65.
51 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951,
art. 66.
52The enterprises subject to the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community are defined in article 80 of the treaty.
53 [1957-58] DOCUMENTS PARLEMENTAIRES, CHAMmRE, No. 21, at 20. See also
note 33 mipra for the function of a "statement of grounds."
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it was born. The crises of the Thirties, postwar economic realign-
ments, and the opening of the Common Market each pointed up the
need for rationalizing the Belgian economy by permitting enterprises
to cooperate among themselves. Several laws, especially fiscal meas-
ures, favored mergers and concentrations. But this commendable
evolution, insofar as it restricts competition on the market, is contrary
to Belgium's economic policy, which favors the conditions of a market
economy and requires, among other things, maintaining a competitive
order. It thus became necessary to set some limits on restrictive prac-
tices which are otherwise encouraged. The Belgian Parliament com-
promised between these contrary exigencies by encouraging economic
power, the generator of efficiency and progress, and punishing its
abuses-by protecting competition, the source of initiative, but only
within the limits of a workable competition.
The Belgian antitrust law, like those in force in other European
countries,54 is conceived differently from that which prevails in the
United States. Although American law admits some flexibility, 5 it is
fundamentally interdictive, declaring many practices illegal per se. 6
Another important difference between recent European antitrust legis-
lation, which Belgium's new statute typifies, and American law is that
the European statutes partake of the whole economic policy of these
nations. The general reorganization following two world wars induced
public authorities in the Old World to follow a comprehensive program
of intervention in the economy. Some countries, like Sweden, adopted
socialistic regimes, while the majority embraced a neo-liberal political
philosophy which vests in the state a major responsibility for ameliorat-
ing economic and social conditions. L'intjr~t gdngral, whose injury
by a preponderant economic power constitutes an abuse, is a concept
belonging to the public law. The corresponding private law concept
is l'ordre public. Both concepts are at the same time rich and variable
in their contents. But the judiciary decides questions affecting l'ordre
public, while the executive fosters l'intjr~t ggniral, since it is defined
to include the basic aims of the nation's policy at any particular
moment. Consequently most European antitrust laws are applied by
the executive, while the emphasis in the United States is more upon
judicial enforcement.
54 See also Law of June 28, 1956, "on economic competition," [1956] STAATBLAD
VAN HET KRONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN 401 (Neth.); [1958] STAATSBLAD VAN HET
KRoNINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN 412 (Neth.).
55 E.g., "the rule of reason," United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106, 178-80 (1911) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911).
56 See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-401 (1927)
(price fixing agreements).
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The Belgian law on the protection against the abuse of economic
power is a new tool. The legislative task is over, but a protracted
social evolution has begun. Belgian businessmen, too long worried
about the conceded need for rationalizing the nation's economy, must
learn about the important role which competition may play in Belgium's
economic and social growth. On the other side, those responsible for
applying the new law will need to feel the delicacy with which their
job of education, control, and repression must be carried out, with the
knowledge that they share in a genuine economic magistracy. Econo-
mists and lawyers will now need to work together in trying to under-
stand the impact and application of this new mechanism for public
regulation of the economy.
The law of May 27, 1960, Belgium's first attempt to regulate
restrictive practices and economic concentration, is an experiment. Its
careful preparation and generally favorable welcome augur well for
its satisfactory adaptation to the nation's social and economic institu-
tions. Only experience will demonstrate whether this law will insure
Belgium the reign of a truly competitive order, which supports a
healthy free enterprise system, and constitutes a major element in the
organization of the Western World.
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